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The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic aspects of EU policy towards
its Eastern neighbors in the former Soviet Union. For a long period of time, this region
was considered as less important for the EU, as compared to Central and Eastern
Europe, which was the subject of a far-reaching economic and political integration
offer materialized in two rounds of EU Eastern Enlargements (2004, 2007). However,
moving the EU's geographical frontier further to the East and Southeast increased the
importance of the CIS region as a potential partner of the enlarged EU. In 2004, East
European  and  Caucasus  countries  were  invited  to  participate  in  the  European
Neighborhood  Policy  a  new  EU  external  policy  framework  also  addressed  to  the
Southern Mediterranean countries. Russia has been attempting to build a strategic
political and economic partnership with the EU outside the ENP framework but the
content of this relationship is, in fact, very similar to the ENP. 
A  general  weakness  of  the  ENP  is  that  there  is  a  lack  of  balance  between  far-
reaching expectations with respect to neighbors' policies and reforms, and limited and
distant  rewards  that  can  potentially  be  offered.  Thus,  making  this  cooperation
framework more effective requires a serious enhancement of the rewards using, to the
extent possible, the positive experience of previous EU enlargements. The nature of
contemporary economic relations in the globalized world calls for a more complex
package-type approach to economic integration rather than just limiting cooperation
to some narrow fields.
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The purpose of this paper1 is to examine the economic aspects of the EU policy
towards its Eastern neighbors. We are going to make a general overview of bilateral
relations  between  the  enlarged  EU  and  CIS  countries  in  the  spheres  of  trade,
investment,  labor  movement,  technical  cooperation,  and  influence  of  the  EU’s
economic  and  institutional  model  on  the  course  of  CIS  economic  reforms  and
institutional modernization. Obviously, the issues mentioned above cannot be fully
separated from the political context and political agenda – domestic, bilateral and
multilateral. However, our analysis will concentrate on economic cooperation and its
impact on economic reforms in CIS countries and will refer to political developments
only to the extent justified by their direct impact on economic developments. 
We use the name of the Commonwealth of Independent States and its abbreviation
CIS purely for analytical convenience – to define a group of twelve successor countries
of the former USSR (all former Soviet republics apart from the Baltic states, which are
now EU members). Although these twelve countries have, to a large extent, a common
historical and institutional background (at least throughout most of the 20th century)
their development strategies, as well as political and economic systems, have become
increasingly divergent from one another after gaining independence. We are also aware
that the role of the CIS as a regional integration block, founded at the end of 1991 in
order to provide a “velvet divorcement” of the former USSR, is gradually decreasing2. 
This paper briefly summarizes the early results of the Specific Targeted Research
Project  (STREP)  on  “EU  Eastern  Neighborhood:  Economic  Potential  and  Future
Development (ENEPO)” funded under the EU Sixth Framework Program, Priority 7
“Citizens  and  Governance  in  a  Knowledge  Based  Society”,  Contract  No  028736
(CIT5) and conducted by a consortium of 11 research institutes led by CASE – Center
for Social and Economic Research in Warsaw. 
Section 1 of this paper characterizes the economic importance of both regions in
their bilateral economic relations. Section 2 examines EU-CIS trade and economic
relations before the EU Eastern Enlargement. Section 3 analyses the basic conceptual
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THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS...
1 This  is  a  revised  and  substantially  amended  version  of  my  paper  on  “Perspectives  of  EU-CIS  economic
relations”  presented  at the  VIII  Annual  International  Conference  of  the  High  School  of  Economics  on
“Economic Modernization and Social Development”, Moscow, April 3-5, 2007. The original (shorter) version
of my paper will be published in the post-Conference proceedings. I would like to thank Elizabeth Rivard for
her excellent editorial support.
2 This group of countries is at times   referred to as the New Independent States (NIS). However, as more than
15 years have passed since the end of 1991 when they obtained independence, this notion also does not sound
accurate. The ambitious task of finding a more appropriate name of this regional group is outside the agenda
of this paper.foundations  of  the  European  Neighborhood  Policy,  the  new  external  policy
framework  of  the  enlarged  EU.  Section  4  provides  a  brief  note  on  the  special
partnership between the EU and Russia. In section 5, we discuss possible directions
in  enhancing  and  upgrading  the  ENP  and  EU-CIS  economic  relations.  Finally,
Section 6 offers brief conclusions.
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of the CIS region for the EU and vice versa
The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements moved the EU external borders to the East
and Southeast, radically altering the EU’s geopolitical and economic perception of the
CIS region and its potential importance as an economic and political partner. 
Until these enlargements, CIS countries formed the second, outer ‘ring’ of the EU
neighbors, being geographically separated from the EU by the EU accession countries
of Central and Eastern Europe. Their economic and political importance for the EU-
15 was quite limited with the exception of Russia, the largest (territorially) country in
the world with huge natural resources and nuclear weapons, directly bordering one
of the EU members (Finland). 
To simplify, the EU-15 real economic and foreign policy interests in cooperation
with CIS countries concentrated primarily on oil and natural gas supply from Russia,
and on relative geopolitical stability of the post-Soviet area (avoiding proliferation of
regional and ethnic conflicts). 
The  picture  changed  with  the  Eastern  Enlargement  of  the  EU.  First,  in  purely
geographical terms four CIS countries – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova – became
the direct EU neighbors sharing long land borders. In a slightly longer time horizon, with
Turkey’s accession, three Caucasian countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) will
also share their land borders with the EU. Already they share the Black Sea with the
enlarged EU. It means that all but Central Asian CIS countries have already moved, or
will move, geographically from the second to the first ring of EU neighbors. 
Most of the new members states (NMS) of the EU have a political and economic
history similar to the countries of the former USSR, not only due to the unfortunate
communist experience of the second half of the 20th century; some of them were part
of the Russian empire (part of Poland, Baltic countries, Finland) before World War I.
There are close ethnic and cultural links between NMS and EU candidate countries
on  the  one  hand  and  CIS  countries  on  the  other  (Romania  –  Moldova,  Poland  –
Belarus  and  Ukraine,  Russian  speaking  minority  in  Baltic  countries,  Turkey  –
Azerbaijan and most of post-Soviet Central Asia). 
Looking at the aggregate trade indicators, the importance of the CIS for the EU-
27  is  not  much  higher  than  it  was  for  the  EU-15.  This  is  a  result  of  the  limited
economic potential of both NMS and CIS. In 2003, the NMS-10 constituted only 4.7%
of EU-25 total GDP and a small share of its total extra-EU export. On the other hand,
even including Russia, the overall CIS share in the world economy is quite limited. It
9
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exports (see WEO, 2004; Table A). 
According to the European Economy (2005) only 2.2% of the total exports of the
EU-25 in 2004 was directed to the CIS (see Table 1). For comparison, another EU
‘neighborhood’ region – the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) accounted for only
a  slightly  higher  share  of  EU-25  countries’  exports  –  3.8%  on  average.  In  CIS
countries the shares of EU exports as part of their total exports are higher, at times
much higher, than the share of EU exports to the region, as illustrated by Table 2.
Such an asymmetry can be considered as normal when less-developed or middle-
income  countries  representing  a  limited  economic  potential3 trade  with  a  large
developed partner or a large and highly integrated trade block. 
However,  the  aggregate  and  average  statistics  presented  in  Table 1 may  be
misleading, for at least three reasons. 
First, the concept of EU-25 exports in this table also includes intra-Union trade,
which accounts for 68.3% of the total (even slightly more if Bulgaria and Romania are
10
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3 This characteristic also applies to Russia in spite of its large territory and geopolitical importance. The total
nominal size of Russia’s 2005 GDP of USD 763 billion (calculated using the current exchange rate) is close
to that of Australia (USD 709 billion), Mexico (USD 768 billion), India (USD 772 billion), Korea (USD 778
billion) and Brazil (USD 796 billion) - WEO 09_2006 database
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx
Source: European Economy 2005, No. 5, Table 57
Table 1. Directions of Exports of Goods, 2004, World = 100%included). Thus, when analyzing the structure of EU external trade, the shares of non-
EU countries/ regions should be tripled, at least. 
Second, Table 1 demonstrates that some of the EU member countries represent
higher shares of trade with the CIS than the EU average. This relates to the three
Baltic  countries,  Poland,  Finland,  Bulgaria  and  Slovenia.  Consequently,  these
countries can gain more from development of EU-CIS trade relations. However, they
are also more vulnerable vis a vis any potential episodes of political, economic or
social destabilization in the CIS4. 
CIS countries also differ among themselves in terms of the importance of their
trade relations with the EU (see Table 2). In 2004, the share of exports to the EU as
part  of  a  country’s  total  exports  varied  from  4.9%  in  Kyrgyzstan  to  65.2%  in
Azerbaijan. Russia is second in this ranking with a share of 50.4%. However, in most
cases, the high share of exports to the EU is determined by just one commodity/ group
of commodities: energy resources in the cases of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia,
aluminum in Tajikistan, diamonds in Armenia, and metal products in Ukraine. The
monoculture structure of CIS countries’ exports can be considered as a serious source
of their potential vulnerability to external shocks. 
Third, the special importance of the energy sector also must be taken into account.
Many EU countries are very much dependent on imports of CIS energy resources
from  Russia  and,  to  a  smaller  but  systematically  increasing  extent,  also  from  the
11
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4 At  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  the  former  CMEA  countries  and  Finland  had  been  heavily  affected  by  a
disruption of this trade block (based on inter-government trade protocols and a special payment mechanism)
and the collapse of the USRR. The next shock originating from the CIS region - the 1998 Russian and CIS
financial crisis – had a less severe and more differentiated impact. Although Central European and Baltic
countries managed to avoid a direct contagion effect with respect to their currencies and financial markets
(unlike most CIS countries), some of them suffered substantial export and GDP losses. This relates, in the first
instance, to Baltic countries and (to lesser extent) to Poland and Bulgaria.
Source: ENEPO WP1 database; UNCTAD Statistical Handbook 2005.
http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx












Uzbekistan  17.4Caspian  Sea  region.  In  2004,  Russia  supplied  approximately  40%  of  all  EU  gas
imports, 32% of all EU oil imports and around 17% of coal imports (Eurostat, 2006).
Individual EU countries represent even higher dependence on energy imports from
the  CIS,  particularly  from  Russia.  For  example,  in  2004,  imported  Russian  gas
accounted for more than 80% of all gas consumed in the Czech Republic, Finland,
Greece, Lithuania and Slovakia (see Jakubiak and Paczynski, 2007). Likewise, energy
export  plays  a  crucial  role  in  countries  such  as  Azerbaijan  (around  90%  of  total
exports), Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan. 
Going beyond trade in goods and services, labor migration from the CIS to the
EU represents another potentially important field of economic cooperation. In spite
of  restrictive  migration  and  visa  policies  in  the  EU,  the  flow  of  labor  migrants
(primarily irregular or illegal migrants) from European CIS countries to the EU is
systematically increasing. 
As in the case of trade flows, migration has an asymmetric impact on both sides
and  their  importance  differs  country  by  country.  For  the  EU  as  a  whole,  the
immigrants of CIS origin still constitute a small share of a total migrant inflows (in
spite of their systematically growing number) and the labor force, much smaller than
intra-EU flows (particularly from the EU NMS to OMS) or migration from the Middle
East,  Africa  and  Asia.  However,  migration  flows  from  the  CIS  are  unevenly
distributed between EU member countries, with the majority of migrants settling in
NMS and Mediterranean countries5.
Considering the “export” side, outgoing migration has become a serious economic
and social phenomenon for some low-income CIS countries where one quarter to one
third of the population of working age works abroad, at least on a seasonal basis – in
Russia, the EU, Turkey and other countries (Kazakhstan in the case of Central Asian
migrants). Emigrants’ remittances constitute a substantial portion of GNP and an
important balance-of-payment item. In the case of Moldova, the outflow of the labor
force  amounts  to  approximately  one  quarter  of  the  working-age  population,  and
remittances accounted for one third of GNP in 2006 (see Luecke, 2007). According to
the same research, remittances amounted to 14% of GNP in Georgia and 17% in
Kyrgyzstan. Other sources differ in terms of exact figures (see Table 3 based on the
UNCTAD  database),  which  is  hardly  surprising  taking  into  consideration  the
unofficial  character  of  labor  migration  and  various  channels  of  transferring
remittances to one’s home country (primarily outside the formal banking sector). 
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5 Factors of geographical, cultural and language proximity play an important role here. Ukrainian labor migrants
prefer, for example, countries of Central Europe such as the Czech Republic, Poland or Slovakia (but many
of them also work in Spain or Portugal), while Moldovan migrants often choose countries with a Romance
language as the official language.Finally, capital flows are important for CIS countries as the potential importers of
capital and at times exporters as well, due to capital flight. For the EU economies, the
size of capital movement between them and the CIS represents a negligible scale. 
For many years CIS countries lagged behind countries of Central and Eastern
Europe in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). This was mainly due to the poor
business and investment climate in this region caused by high inflation, high fiscal
deficits,  currency  instability,  poor  protection  of  property  rights,  insider-oriented
privatization,  numerous  bureaucratic  obstacles  (including  those  directly  affecting
foreign  investors),  delays  in  adopting  market-oriented  legislation  and  its  effective
enforcement,  pervasive  corruption,  a  fragile  financial  sector,  and  underdeveloped
infrastructure, for example. A substantial part of recorded FDI had, in fact, post-
Soviet  origin  even  if  it  was  formally  recorded  as  originating  in  other  countries
(repatriation  of  capital,  which  earlier  fled  CIS  countries).  Most  investments  were
concentrated in only a few sectors such as energy or mobile telephony. 
The situation began to change quite recently, in the mid-2000s, with rapid capital
inflows to the largest CIS economies such as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Their
sectoral destination is much broader than before, including various manufacturing
industries,  retail  trade,  financial  services,  etc.  Also,  this  FDI  is  accompanied  by
increasing portfolio capital flows (see Lozovyi and Kudina, 2007). 
On the other hand, some smaller CIS economies managed to increase FDI flows
either  due  to  investment  in  the  energy  sector  (Azerbaijan),  or  as  a  result  of
privatization and some improvement in the investment climate (Armenia, Georgia
and Moldova). However, CIS countries continue to experience a substantial gap in the
size  of  FDI  flows,  not  only  with  respect  to  EU  NMS,  but  also  to  countries  of
Southeastern Europe (see Table 4). 
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Note: Workers' remittances are goods and financial instruments transferred by migrants living and
working (as residents) in a new economy to residents of the home economy.
Source: ENEPO WP1 database; UNCTAD Statistical Handbook 2005.
http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx
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Source: ENEPO WP1 Database; UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment database (http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/);
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2006.
Table 4: Foreign direct investment, inward stock, 2005
Countries  Per capita in USD % of GDP
EU NMS    
Bulgaria 1185.0 34.3
Cyprus  10496.7 52.7
Czech Republic  5831.4 48.1
Estonia  9125.9 93.6
Hungary  6068.7 55.9
Latvia  2079.5 28.7
Lithuania  1891.9 25.1
Malta  10380.8 77.3
Poland  2445.4 31.1
Romania 1101.0 24.2
Slovakia 2844.5 32.8
Slovenia  4035.9 23.7




EU Potential candidates    
Albania 536.9 20.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 528.9 21.9
Serbia and Montenegro 664.6 20.7





Kazakhstan  1660.6 44.8
Kyrgyzstan  101.2 21.4
Moldova 268.4 37.9
Russia 925.5 17.3
Tajikistan  80.2 22.6
Ukraine 365.3 21.1
Uzbekistan  36.2 8.22. EU – CIS economic relations before
the EU Eastern Enlargement
Cooperation between the EU-15 and new independent states of the former USSR
was built on the basis of bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA)
negotiated during the 1990s. Nine of them entered in force between 1997 and 1999,
after a lengthy ratification process, (see Table 5). The PCA with Belarus was signed in
March  1995  and  PCA  with  Turkmenistan  in  May  1998;  yet,  to  date,  neither  has
entered into force due to political reasons. The PCA with Tajikistan was signed in
October 2004 but the ratification process has yet to finish. 
The PCAs offered very little in the area of economic integration: the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) clause, some sectoral, legal and institutional cooperation in such areas
as transportation, energy, competition policy, some legal approximation in the areas
of  custom  law,  corporate  law,  banking  law,  intellectual  property  rights,  technical
standards and certification, etc.6 However, dialogue and cooperation in the area of
legal and institutional approximation was lacking both sufficient incentives and an
enforcement mechanism. 
This differed from the agenda and implementation mechanism of the Trade and
Association  Agreements  (TAA)  signed  by  the  EEC/EU  with  Central  European  and
Baltic countries at the beginning and middle of the 1990s, as well as the Stabilization
and Association Agreements (SAA) negotiated with Western Balkan countries in the
2000s. Both TAAs and SAAs were aimed at building “deep” free trade areas, and
15
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6 The 2003 Commission Communication on Wider Europe (see Section 3 of this paper for details) stated explicitly
(p. 5): “In contrast to contractual relations with all the EU’s other neighbouring countries, the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in force with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova grant neither preferential treatment
for trade, nor a timetable for regulatory approximation”,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm
Table 5. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between EU and CIS Countries









Uzbekistan 1.07.1999included  a  broad  agenda  of  institutional  harmonization  (adopting  acquis by  EU
partners) and, most importantly, offered a perspective of EU membership. Some of
the TAAs and SAAs were negotiated and signed simultaneously with WTO accession
of the respective countries, in few cases even before the formal conclusion of the
latter. This was in sharp contrast to the EU attitude to CIS countries: their WTO
membership was considered by the EU as a basic precondition to start negotiating any
kind of bilateral free trade agreement. 
The  WTO  accession  process  of  the  largest  CIS  countries  (Russia,  Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, excluding Belarus) went slowly so the perspective of trade liberalization
between the EU and them remained distant until very recently. Furthermore, even those
smaller countries – Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia – which joined the WTO
in the late 1990s or early 2000s, also did not receive any trade liberalization offer. 
To have a complete picture one must admit, however, that all CIS countries could
benefit,  to  a  various  degree,  from  the  Generalized  System  of  Preferences  (GSP)
offered  unilaterally  by  the  EU  to  less  developed  countries7.  These  are  primarily
preferential import tariffs. 
From the very beginning of their independence, CIS countries also benefited from
generous European aid programs delivered both by the EEC/EU as a whole and its
individual member states (Light, 2007). Among these programs, TACIS (Technical
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) was aimed at supporting the
democratic and market transition, economic and social modernization, cross-border
cooperation and solving numerous regional/ sub-regional issues. 
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7 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/index_en.htm3. European Neighborhood Policy
– A Basic Conceptual Framework
The EU attitude towards the CIS region began to change at the beginning of the
2000s. The forthcoming EU Eastern Enlargement stimulated an intra-EU debate and
conceptual  effort  on  upgrading  its  relations  with  both  its  Eastern  and  Southern
neighbors. On the other hand, it reflected the notion that the CIS region is far from
being  homogeneous  in  political,  economic  and  social  terms,  and  CIS  countries
require a more individualized approach (Light, 2007). 
The  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European
Parliament on “Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with
our Eastern and Southern Neighbors” (of March 11, 2003)8 was the first attempt to
propose  a  new  policy  framework  towards  countries  which  are  to  become  direct
geographical  neighbors  after  the  then  forthcoming  Eastern  Enlargement.  This
document was followed by the official launch of the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP) on May 12, 2004, less than two weeks after the first and main phase of the EU
Eastern Enlargement was successfully completed. 
Interestingly,  the  2003  Communication  on  Wider  Europe,  which  reflected  the
initial position of the Commission, offered a wider and more far-reaching vision of
cooperation with neighbors and clearer incentives for them than the subsequent 2004
European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper9, which also took into account the
views of the individual member states. The differences were that in the first paper, the
focus was on clearer language of access to the EU internal market, perspectives of free
movement  of  people,  visa  facilitation,  and  other  potential  incentives,  while  the
Strategy Paper put more emphasis on EU security interests, fighting illegal migration,
etc. (Schweickert et al., 2007). 
According to the ENP Strategy Paper, the declared ENP objective was to avoid the
emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its old and new direct
neighbors, as well as strengthening stability, security and well being in the entire
mega-region. The EU offered its neighbors “…a privileged relationship, building upon
a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law,
good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP
goes beyond existing relationships to offer a deeper political relationship and economic
17
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8 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf
9 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdfintegration. The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the extent to which
these values are effectively shared”10. 
Originally this general declaration was followed by a clear statement that the ENP
is not concerned with the next EU enlargements nor does it offer neighbors an EU
accession perspective. At the end of 2006 it was replaced by a more flexible approach
citing that “the ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does
not prejudge, for European neighbors, how their relationship with the EU may develop
in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions.” In fact, this can be considered as
return to both the language and spirit of the above-mentioned Communication on
Wider Europe of the Commission in 2003. 
As a result, the door became hypothetically opened for those CIS countries which
are participants of the ENP (see below) and which will be ready to harmonize their
political, economic and legal systems with acquis. This seems to be, however, a very
distant  and  unclear  perspective,  particularly  if  one  takes  into  consideration  the
phenomenon of “enlargement fatigue” observed recently in some countries of Western
Europe. Although the anti-enlargement sentiment works particularly strongly against
the EU membership aspirations of Turkey (for historical and cultural reasons), one
can expect a similar reaction to the EU membership aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova
or Caucasus countries when they begin to materialize. 
So, if the perspective of EU membership is either very weak and distant (the case of
European  CIS  countries)  or  non-existent  (the  case  of  the  Southern  Mediterranean
neighbors), what are the alternative incentives provided by the ENP to neighboring
countries to encourage them to undertake a costly modernization effort, accept the
European set of values in the area of democracy, human rights and market economy,
and close cooperation with the EU on security issues? The general answer is: access to
the  EU  internal  market.  The  ENP  Strategy  Paper  (p.14)11 offers  “...  neighbouring
countries the prospect of a stake in the EU Internal Market [underlined by MD] based on
legislative and regulatory approximation, the participation in a number of EU programmes
and improved interconnection and physical links with the EU”. However, so far there is
no clear interpretation of what “a stake in the EU Internal Market” means in practice. 
Furthermore, taking into consideration the poorly developed institutional basis of
trade and economic relations between the EU and CIS countries (based only on PCAs
– see Section 2 of this paper), it is very unlikely that the ENP can offer the latter full
participation  in  the  EU  internal  market,  similar  to  that  of  Norway,  Iceland  or
Switzerland. A gradual building up of these relations based on more or less “deep”
free trade agreements (FTA) and selective participation in some segments of the EU
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10 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm
11 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdfinternal market, a process which will take at least one decade, seems to be a more
realistic option at the moment. 
Recent ENP official documents12 put greater emphasis on the necessity to use this
institutional  framework  as  a  tool  of  modernization  and  support  to  economic  and
institutional reforms in neighborhood countries. Again, concrete perspectives have yet
to follow, particularly with respect to tangible incentives. 
The ENP is conducted through bilateral Action Plans and the principle of bilateralism
is  deeply  rooted  in  this  policy  framework,  contrary  to  the  regional  approach,  which
governed the recent EU Eastern Enlargement. This does not mean, however, that third-
country externalities of bilateral agreements will be completely ignored. For instance,
some form of coordination on the EU side of future FTA negotiations with Russia and
Ukraine is not excluded. Simultaneous negotiations and signing actions plans between
the EU and all three Caucasus countries (in mid-November 2006) can serve as another
good example of a coordinated sub-regional approach. 
The  ENP  has  covered  five  CIS  countries  to  date:  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia,
Moldova  and  Ukraine.  All  of  these  countries  agreed  and  signed  bilateral  three-year
Action Plans with the EU in 2005-2006. However, the implementation record of Action
Plans for Moldova and Ukraine, which were launched at the beginning of 2005, is mixed
(see Jakubiak et al., 2006 on Moldova and Jakubiak, Kolesnichenko et al., 2006 on
Ukraine). Economic and institutional reforms in these two countries are going rather
slowly and the lack of a clear set of external incentives and a clear cooperation timetable
can be considered as one of the major reasons for this unsatisfactory performance. 
Negotiations on the new EU – Ukraine Enhanced Agreement launched in March
200713 can be considered the next step in building a closer cooperation framework
with this important ENP country. The new agreement will replace the PCA and may
include, among other possibilities, a “deep” FTA based on the existing feasibility
study (see Emerson et al., 2006). In June 2007, Ukraine also signed a visa facilitation
agreement with the EU14, following a similar agreement between the EU and Russia
(see Section 4). 
Belarus is a potential ENP participant but it currently has a “frozen” status, for
political reasons (an autocratic regime and violation of human rights); similarly, this
is the case for Libya and Syria in the Mediterranean region. The EU also launched a
mechanism of strategic partnership with Russia, similar to the ENP (see Section 4). 
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EN&guiLanguage=enFive  Central  Asian  countries  have  been  left  outside  the  ENP  but  one  cannot
exclude the possibility that some of them (most likely beginning with Kazakhstan) will
be invited to join this cooperation framework at some point in future. During its
meeting  from  June  21-22,  2007  in  Brussels,  the  European  Council  approved  the
document titled “The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”15, which
outlines the EU strategy towards this sub-region. Its agenda is, however, narrower
and less ambitious compared to the ENP. 
A  general  weakness  of  the  ENP  is  the  lack  of  balance  between  far-reaching
expectations  in  respect  to  neighbors’  policies  and  reforms,  and  limited  and  distant
rewards which it can potentially offer (see Schweickert et al., 2007). This imbalance is
especially acute in such areas as migration policy, where the EU is looking for extensive
cooperation of neighboring countries in fighting illegal migration to the EU (very often,
against the interests of their own citizens), while offering very little in the realm of
facilitating legal migration and freer movement of people (see Guild et al., 2007). 
More  generally,  there  is  doubt  as  to  whether  the  lack  of  a  clear  offer  of  EU
membership  can  mobilize  governments  of  the  neighboring  countries  to  conduct
difficult and sometimes unpopular economic and institutional reforms required to
align with acquis (Milcher, Slay and Collins, 2007). On the other hand, one may ask
whether the perspective of EU membership, even if hypothetically provided, would be
interesting and attractive enough for all the neighboring countries, many of them
from a different historical and cultural background, and with other geopolitical and
economic priorities than those shared by EU members. We will come back to this
question in Section 5 of this paper. 
Another  controversial  aspect  of  the  ENP  relates  to  the  strictly  geographical
concept  of  this  initiative  addressed  only  to  countries,  which  share  land,
Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea borders with EU members16. As a result, post-
Soviet  Central  Asia  has  been  left  outside  the  ENP  in  spite  of  its  close  historical,
economic and political links to CIS ENP countries and Russia, and its increasing
economic importance for the EU as a prospective energy supplier. 
In  addition,  combining  these  two  very  different  regions  under  one  policy
framework does not necessarily make the ENP more coherent, easier to manage and
able to generate regional externalities. In the short term, however, the experience of
EU cooperation with the Mediterranean region under the Barcelona process, and of
quite complex Association Agreements concluded between EU and individual Middle
East and North Africa countries in the 1990s and early 2000s, may create a positive
demonstration effect on how best to upgrade the less advanced economic cooperation
between the EU and CIS countries.
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15 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10113.en07.pdf
16 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Jordan being the exception to this rule.4. Special partnership framework for Russia
In spite of an initial offer from the EU, the Government of the Russian Federation
opted out of participating in the formal ENP framework, preferring to have separate,
strategic  partnership  relations  with  the  EU.  This  framework  is  to  be  built  on  the
concept of the Common European Economic Space between the EU and Russia, as
defined by joint declarations of subsequent EU-Russia summits in October 3, 200117
and May 31, 200318. The next step involved a joint EU-Russia declaration on May 10,
2005 defining so-called road maps of four common spaces19:
• Common Economic Space (including environmental and energy issues)
• Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (including migration and visa
issues)
• Common Space of External Security
• Common Space on Research, Education and Culture
Beginning in 2007, Russia is also a beneficiary country of the European Neighborhood
Policy Instrument (ENPI), which replaced the previous aid program, TACIS. 
The  EU  and  Russia  are  about  to  commence  negotiations  on  the  new  strategic
cooperation agreement aimed to replace the old PCA (see Section 2) signed in 1994 and
entering in force in 1997. However, details of the content of this new treaty have yet to
be determined. For example, it is unclear whether it will include a free trade agreement
between the EU and Russia and how “deep” this type of agreement might be. 
In  2006,  the  EU  and  Russia  also  signed  a  visa  facilitation  agreement,  which
entered into force on June 1, 2007. This agreement, which is similar to the one signed
by the EU and Ukraine in 2007, makes short-term travel for various categories of
visitors (including business people) easier and opens the opportunity to negotiate a
visa free regime in the long term. 
Generally,  Russia  has  the  chance  to  develop  a  broad  agenda  of  economic,
political and institutional cooperation with the EU, comparable to that of the most
advanced ENP countries (Moldova and Ukraine in Eastern Europe; Morocco and
Tunisia in the Mediterranean region) or even going beyond this benchmark. Given
the large size of the Russian economy and its middle income status, the key role of
Russia’s  energy  exports  in  meeting  EU  energy  demand,  and  the  geopolitical
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17 http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/images/pText_pict/238/sum41.doc
18 http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_234.htm
19 http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/images/pText_pict/494/road%20maps.pdfimportance  of  this  country  (but  without  EU  membership  aspirations  at  the
moment), the EU may be potentially interested in closer economic integration of
Russia with the EU internal market. This, in turn, could help the Russian economy
to  complete  its  market  transition,  and  advance  its  modernization  and
diversification. However, the future of EU-Russia cooperation will depend on the
speed  of  domestic  economic  and  political  reforms  in  Russia,  as  well  as  on  the
geopolitical interest of the latter to build closer links with the EU. 
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The fundamental weakness of the ENP, i.e. its internal imbalance between effort
needed to harmonize neighboring countries institutions with acquis and incentives
provided (see Section 3), leads many experts to call for a serious enhancement on the
“reward” side. For example, Emerson et al. (2007) propose the concept of ENP Plus,
which should add the following elements to the existing ENP design:
• an advanced association model for the able and willing partner states,
• a strengthening of regional-multilateral schemes,
• upgrading of the standard instruments being deployed,
• the offer of an ‘ENP light’ model for difficult states or non-recognized entities.
Indeed, in order to have a real impact on development, modernization and reform
of CIS countries, the ENP initiative must go beyond the narrowly defined cooperation
agenda in some selected sectors and areas considered a priority by the EU (examples
of these areas include energy supply and fighting illegal migration), as well as address
a broader set of issues. 
In the economic sphere, both the EU and neighboring countries must go beyond
the  idea  of  simple  trade  liberalization  in  the  narrow  sense  (i.e.  scrapping  tariffs,
mostly for manufactured products) towards a more complex and ambitious agenda.
The contemporary global economy is much more sophisticated than it was a few
decades ago and its complexity determines the need for broader liberalization (called
sometimes a “deep FTA”, “enhanced FTA” or “FTA plus” – see above), also involving
freer  movement  of  services,  investments  and  labor  based  on  a  far-reaching
institutional harmonization/ alignment package. Let us take a brief look at how this
web of mutually dependent policies works: 
1. Trade expansion between the EU and its Eastern neighbors will depend not only
on trade liberalization per se (first membership of all the CIS countries in the
WTO, then their FTAs with the EU), but also on the investment climate in the CIS
region, speed of institutional harmonization and, to some extent, on liberalization
of movement of people (particularly important for trade in services). 
2. Intensification of foreign investment inflow to the CIS region will depend not only
on significant improvement of their domestic investment climate (determined by
the speed of institutional harmonization), but also on trade liberalization, offering
investors in CIS economies easy access to European markets. 
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can weaken the income motive of labor migration from several CIS countries
and make freer movement of people less politically and socially controversial in
the EU countries.
4. Free movement of people is important not only for balancing national labor
markets (both in “origin” and “destination” countries) and the current account
(in “origin” countries). It is also significant for the development of the domestic
SME sector in “origin’ countries and the learning experience of more mature
market  economies  and  democratic  societies,  thus,  strengthening  domestic
constituencies in favor of democratic and market reforms (in “origin” countries). 
5. Institutional harmonization very often involves substantial social, political and
(sometimes) economic costs. Without strong incentives/ potential rewards these
costs may be considered too high by societies and politicians in neighboring
countries. The traditional pay-off offered by the EU to the CIS countries (very
gradual  improvement  of  their  trade  regime  with  the  EU  and  technical
assistance) seems to be insufficient. A stronger set of incentives should probably
include at least a faster pace of trade liberalization and liberalization of the
movement of people. In the case of countries that are explicitly interested in EU
membership,  such  a  perspective  should  not  be  ruled  out  a  priori, as  it  is
potentially an important and powerful incentive.
It is a quite recognizable fact that the perspective of EU membership (even if it is
very distant in time) can become a very powerful incentive, which speeds up political,
economic and institutional reforms, aids in solving ethnic and political conflicts, and
mobilizes societies and politicians to accept the most unpopular reform measures and
undertake the most difficult modernization efforts. This is the observation which can
be drawn from the previous EU enlargement experience, particularly that of Northern
Mediterranean countries in the 1970s and 1980s, and Central and Eastern European
countries, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The same can be said for Western
Balkan countries and Turkey, despite their quite distant timetable of accession. 
The situation of CIS countries seems to be less favorable in this respect. In most
cases, their societies express limited interest in the idea of deep European integration
apart from Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. But, more importantly, there has been a
lack of a serious “European offer” from the EU addressed to these countries and
societies,  which  has  made  the  pro-reform  integration  incentive  unrealistic.  At  the
moment, it is hard to say whether the ENP will provide such an incentive, but this
cannot  be  totally  ruled  out.  Very  much  will  depend  on  the  real  interest  and
determination  of  individual  CIS  countries  to  deepen  their  economic  and  political
relations with the enlarged EU. 
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Until very recently, CIS countries did not belong to the first ring of EU neighbors
and their economic importance as potential partners of the EU was very limited (with
the exception of supplying energy resources to the EU, primarily from Russia). This
situation began to change with the Eastern Enlargement of the EU completed in 2004
and  2007.  The  European  and  Caucasus  countries  of  the  CIS  region  moved
geographically from the second to the first ring of neighbors. The NMS from Central
and Eastern Europe have closer economic, social and cultural relations with the CIS
region than most of the EU old members. In addition, CIS countries, after a decade-
long period of severe adaptation output decline, entered the phase of rapid growth,
which generates more demand for EU-originated imports and investments, and offers
more benefits of enhanced economic cooperation for both sides. 
The  new  geopolitical  and  economic  circumstances  led  the  EU  to  offer  the  new
cooperation  framework,  called  the  ENP,  to  part  of  the  CIS  and  the  Southern
Mediterranean region (Middle East and North Africa). Simultaneously, it launched a
similar cooperation framework with Russia. However, the main ENP weakness thus far
is  its  lack  of  internal  balance:  the  EU  expected  far-reaching  cooperation  of  the
neighborhood countries in areas considered as having priority importance for the EU
(for example, energy supply and fighting illegal migration), while it offered very few
incentives  in  exchange.  Thus,  making  this  cooperation  framework  more  effective
requires a serious enhancement of the rewards using, to the extent possible, the positive
experience of the previous EU enlargements. The nature of the contemporary economic
relations in the globalized world calls for a more complex package-type approach to
economic integration rather than limiting cooperation to some narrow fields. 
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